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Introduction
I am delighted to have been given this opportunity to reflect on issues relating to 
my chosen area of research. I am particularly fortunate because, as the third win-
ner of the International Award for Entrepreneurship and Small Business Research 
after David Birch and Arnold Cooper, I have the longest period of any of the current 
contributors over which to conduct my reflections –nearly 20 years. 
Few, if any, prize-winners really know why they get chosen, although my com-
mendation refers to both “impact on policy-makers” and to the “policy-relevance 
of the research.”  Without mentioning it specifically, I suspect the award was influ-
enced by my book, Understanding the Small Business Sector, published in 1994.
Making an award on these grounds was, with hindsight, a brave decision for 
three reasons. The first was that the book had only been published four years 
previously, so its impact was hard to assess. A second risk was that it was primarily 
about the United Kingdom. Thirdly, it had a strong focus upon a topic of peripheral 
interest to most entrepreneurship scholars – public policy. 
To some extent that decision may now be vindicated by the evidence provided by 
Hans Landstrom et al. (2012). They show Understanding the Small Business Sector 
to be the 10th core contributor to Entrepreneurship studies. However, the risk of it 
being a “European” contribution is reflected in their unpublished data. This shows 
its impact is almost entirely European, with less than 7 percent of its’ cites being 
from US-located Scholars – compared with 79 percent of those from Europe. This 
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compares with an average of 44 percent and 37 percent respectively for the Top 
Cited 20 works in Entrepreneurship.5 The work therefore has had its impact, but it 
is primarily outside the academic heartland of entrepreneurship. This is important 
context for the reflections that follow.
The Public Policy Recommendations in Understanding hhe 
Small Business Sector (1994)
In the early to mid-1990s the UK government had about 15 years of experience 
in delivering both SME and Entrepreneurship Policy. Drawing upon that experience 
the core recommendations in Understanding the Small Business Sector were:
• It is vitally important that the government produces a White Paper on this topic 
which sets out the objectives and targets of policy in measurable terms. 
• Three areas of public policy where the “returns” were open to question were 
identified:
 » Deregulation and administrative simplification.
 » Training.
 » Information and Advice. 
• Policy should place a greater emphasis upon:
 » Setting the appropriate macro-environment. 
 » Technology policy.
 » Grants.
 » Targeting policies towards firms with growth potential.
What Has Changed Since 1994 and Why?
It is a challenge, even half-objectively, to sit back and ask yourself to what extent 
have the changes in your field been for better or for worse. It is even more tricky to 
speculate on the role your work has played in these changes but, if conducted, such 
speculation might pose a series of questions.
For example, did you get it right in 1994? Since then, have you changed your 
mind on key issues? If so, is that based either on new evidence, or because of chan-
ged circumstances or because, quite simply, you were wrong at the time?
There is, of course, no shame in changing your mind. There may even be honour 
through association, since it places you in the same group as the most influential-
ever scholar in entrepreneurship – Joseph Schumpeter6. 
5. All other works in the list have at least 30 percent of cites from US-based academics.
6. Landstrom et al. (2012).
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Even so, self-assessing your own contribution is, in my view, an invidious task, and 
particularly so for someone who has always been deeply suspicious of any form of 
self-report data relating to entrepreneurs!
So, instead, I shall limit myself to a more restricted agenda comprising the extent 
to which I believe our knowledge-base has been improved; to highlight areas 
where knowledge improvement is still needed and to conclude by musing about 
the extent to which this “academic” knowledge is actually influential amongst 
the group of users of greatest interest to me – public policymakers. I’ll leave the 
judgements to others.
Context
Virtually all high and middle income countries use taxpayer monies to provide 
support for either new firms or small firms. This support can be in the form of, 
for example, information/advice or tax-breaks or access to subsidised/guaranteed 
funds to established small firms. This is referred to by Lundstrom and Stevenson 
(2005) as SME Policy [SMEP]. Alternatively, public funds may be used to provide 
advice or funding to individuals to begin a business. This is called Entrepreneurship 
Policy [EP].
The monies used for these purposes are normally considerable. In the UK, 
in 2002, public funding to small firms [SMEP] exceeded that given to either the 
Universities or to the police-force. A recent careful study of Sweden suggested a 
broadly similar pro rata scale of support [Lundstrom et al. 2014] with expenditure 
on SMEP also dwarfing EP in that country. 
The underpinning justification for such a scale of expenditure is to address the 
market failure that, without this expenditure, the level of enterprise/entrepreneur-
ship in the country would be socially sub-optimal. By this we mean that without 
such funding there would be fewer and worse-paid jobs, a lower level of income or 
wealth, less innovation, more unemployment etc.
However there are many other competing claims for public funds –particularly 
in recessionary times – so it is vital for those making claims for the effectiveness 
of such funds to be able to demonstrate that these yield the benefits claimed for 
them.
My research contributes to assessing whether the taxpayer gets value for money 
from the funds used for SMEP and EP. Hopefully it then also assists policy-makers 
in making cost-effective decisions in these policy areas. It is not about helping indi-
vidual new and small firms to perform better – although the expectation is that, if 
the policy framework is appropriate, this improves the performance of new and 
small firms as a group.7  
7. It is for this reason that the title of the 1994 book was not Understanding Small Business 
but Understanding the Small Business Sector.
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Changes Over 20 Years
During the last twenty years our knowledge-base about the impact of both EP and 
SMEP has increased considerably for two main reasons. 
The first is that, as noted above, virtually every middle and high income coun-
try in the world now has some component of SMEP and EP and most countries 
have an extensive suite of such policies. It is therefore, in principle, possible to 
examine policy effectiveness in a wide range of countries, under very different 
macro- economic regimes and in very different political contexts. It is also the 
case that, even what appears to be the same policy initiative – such as the provi-
sion of advice or a financial guarantee provided by the state – is in practice very 
different in each country because the “small print” of the terms and conditions 
often varies  considerably.8 In principle this diversity is helpful since it enables 
a judgement to be reached on whether some policy regimes look to be broadly 
more successful than others. In practice, however, as we shall show later, this 
judgement is clouded by the patchy assessment procedures adopted by govern-
ments to assess impact.
The second major change over 20 years is the advance in statistical met-
hods – the science has improved very considerably. So, for example, we might 
wish to assess whether providing advice and networking assistance to new or 
small firms improves their survival rate or enhances their growth rate. There 
are now a range of statistical techniques that enable such assessments to be 
made with considerably greater accuracy than was the case in the past [Imbens 
and Wooldridge (2008)]. Broadly what these techniques do is to enable the 
performance of firms that benefit from a policy [called the treatment group] 
to be validly compared with otherwise similar firms that did not benefit [the 
non-treatment group]. This is equivalent to drug-trials for new pharmaceutical 
products since it tests whether the drug/advice makes an improvement to the 
patient/business.
These statistical techniques, however, require considerable data comprising 
“panels” of firms over a number of years. This is vital for new and small firms since 
so many firms have a very short “life” and some have periods of rapid growth follo-
wed by collapse. The panels therefore have to capture this volatility amongst both 
the treated and the non-treated groups in order to assess whether there is a better 
performance amongst the treated group and whether any better performance is 
because of the assistance provided.
 Statisticians are therefore fortunate that there has been a third change over 
time –with more of such databases having been established – even if though they 
continue to remain the exception rather than the rule.     
8. For example Loan Guarantee programmes differ significantly in Mexico, Canada, 
Netherlands [OECD 2007].
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Have The 1994 Recommendations Stood The Test Of Time?
We now examine the extent to which the 1994 recommendations are supported 
or rejected by the changed circumstances of improved statistical methods and bet-
ter data. It is not possible, given the space constraints to adequately cover all the 
recommendations noted earlier, so this text will focus on two:
1. The impact of advice/ training and attitudinal change on the owners of new 
and small firms.
2. Targeting policies towards firms with growth potential.
The impact of advice/ training and attitudinal change: A review of the results 
of using advanced statistical approaches, usually drawing on large databases, is 
provided in Table 1. It is taken from Rigby and Ramoglan (2013).  It reports the 
results of studies examining the impact of programmes that provide training, 
advice and finance to new and small firms. It also covers programmes seeking to 
promote an entrepreneurial mindset amongst college students in the expectation 
that, perhaps some years hence, these individuals will be more likely to become 
a (successful) entrepreneur/ business-owner than an otherwise similar individual 
who did not participate in such a programme.
Unfortunately, for many policy-makers wishing to demonstrate the impact of 
the considerable public expenditure in this area, the results have proven disap-
pointing in several cases, and even embarrassing in others. Rigby and Ramoglan 
(2013) say:
“While policies and programmes for entrepreneurship can be simplistically 
modelled as a series of inputs beginning with cultural change followed by 
general and then more specific skill development, it is hard nevertheless to 
assess impact or trace causality because of the difficulty of defining discrete 
units of input, the presence of confounding factors and the length of time over 
which effects can build.”
Examples of this difficulty linking items of EP and SMEP to tangible impact on 
individual firm performance include the exemplar Swedish study by Norrman and 
Bager-Sjögren (2011). They conclude: 
“The evidence of an impact of the support to early stages ventures given by the 
public programme is weak or non-existent. The higher number of outliers in the 
supported groups could be an indication of prospective success if the time span 
is prolonged over seven years. Our test of the projects that programme officials 
considered to be most promising did not support their belief” p.615
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TABLE 1: Statistical Studies of the Impact of Entrepreneurship and SME Policies on 
Enterprises
Source: Rigby and Ramoglan (2013) 
Notes:  IV=instrumental variables   DiD=difference in difference   PSM=Propensity Score Matching  
RCT=randomised controlled trial    Med= medium term effect  SR=short run effect
Indeed the overall impression derived from the Table is that the findings are “mixed” 
and, even where the findings are positive – such as those in Pons Rotger et al. (2011) 
or  Storey and Wren (2002), the magnitude of the impact is normally less than 5 per-
cent and often is only clearly applicable to some, but not all, groups of firms.
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In short, the 1994 conclusion that the impact on new and small firm performance 
of business advice remains “unproven” has changed little over twenty years despite 
virtually every developed country spending considerable sums providing such 
advice. Broadly, the same conclusion applies to programmes seeking to provide 
management training to the owners of small enterprises. Quite simply, the jury 
continues to be out for policy in this area. 
Disconcertingly, the same conclusion has to be reached over the myriad of stu-
dies that have examined the impact of enterprise education. This area of research 
was recently summarised by Rideout and Gray (2013). Having reviewed studies of 
University Entrepreneurship education world-wide between 1997 and 2011 they 
concluded that only 11 had used “some minimal counter-factual comparison”.
Targeting policies towards firms with growth potential: If the 1994 reser-
vations over public expenditure on SME training and advice continue to be 
supported by more recent statistical evidence, the same cannot be said for the 
recommendation that policies should “target firms with growth potential”. This 
is because the statistical tests on large-scale data bases have convinced me, at 
least, that being able to predict the performance – growth and survival – of new 
enterprises is extremely difficult. 
The reason why this recommendation was made in 1994 was that cohort ana-
lysis showed that, out of every 100 new enterprises only 40 survived for a decade. 
Of these, the largest 4 provided half the jobs in the surviving firms, implying that 4 
percent of those that started ended up creating half the jobs. This continues to be 
verified in recent work. For example Anyadike-Danes et al .(2013) say:
“There is widespread acceptance of the proposition that a relatively small 
proportion of firms are responsible for a disproportionate share of job creation”. 
p.29
This concentration of job creation amongst a tiny proportion of new firms points 
to the potential “returns” in avoiding providing assistance to the vast bulk of new 
firms which had negligible economic impact and focussing instead upon those with 
“growth potential”.
However in recent years I have been fortunate to undertake work with collea-
gues such as Julian Frankish, Richard Roberts and Alex Coad. We have spent much 
of that time analysing a panel, or cohort, of 6247 new enterprises that began to 
trade for the first time in the first quarter of 20049. They constitute the closest pos-
9. There are other panels of start-up firms – again often in the Nordic countries. For example 
Dahl and Sorenson (2012) have a panel of Danish start-ups that come from government 
registers collected inthe Integrated Database for Labor Market Research (referred to by 
its Danish acronym, IDA) andthe Entrepreneurship Database, both maintained by Statistics 
Denmark. The latter contains annual information on the identities of the primary founders 
of new firms in Denmark from 1995 to 2004. Their sample comprises 15,884 new ventures 
all of which have at least one employee in the first year.
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sible representation of new firms in England. These new businesses are customers 
of Barclays Bank and (all of) their anonymised financial transactions have been 
tracked over six years. Their basic characteristics are:
• After six years only 1,2 percent of those starting have 10 employees or annual 
sales of £1m.  
• During their first six years annual closure rates vary from 8 to 14 percent. 
• The volatility of sales in each six month period is considerable, meaning our 
ability to predict future growth is very low indeed.
Analysing this panel has persuaded me that, whilst it is possible to formulate 
models that predict new firm survival with acceptable levels of accuracy, the sales 
volatility of new firms is so great and subject to random fluctuations that public 
policy makers would be unwise to frame public support on these grounds. Even 
simple “rules” such as providing support for firms that have performed well in the 
last 6 months or 12 months would not lead to “better” firms being selected.10   
For these reasons I have concluded that, although there is arithmetic merit in 
providing support for a tiny minority of new and small firms, this is operationally 
difficult or impossible to deliver.
Political Reservations Over the Conduct Of Evaluations
Although the last 20 years have seen a considerable increase in the confidence 
with which analysts are able to assess the impact of EP and SMEP, progress towards 
incorporating these evaluations into the policy process has been slow. Perhaps part 
of the reason for this was captured in the finding by Bager-Sjögren and Norrman 
(2011). They pointed not only to the lack of impact of business support, but also to 
the divergence between the views of the programme officials and the results from 
the statistical analysis. This may go a long way to explaining why it is that project 
officials are, in almost all cases, robustly opposed to statistical analysis being con-
ducted on “their” programmes. My contentious casual observation is that, in the 
areas of SMEP and EP, the more sophisticated the statistical analysis the weaker is 
the reported programme impact. 
OECD (2007) captured this point. They acknowledged that statistical analysis 
had three deficiencies for the policy maker. The first was that it was considerably 
more expensive than obtaining “happy sheets” from programme participants. The 
second was that the analysis often took a long time to deliver – by which time the 
programme had frequently been abandoned, modified or even expanded in scale, 
10. See Frankish et al. (2013); Coad et al.(2013).
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so the results of the evaluation constituted “economic history” and could therefore 
be set aside. Finally, Ministers and senior public servants were rarely personally 
comfortable with this approach. A photograph of a happy small business owner 
who had received funding was worth much more than a thousand equations!
For all these reasons, although it is now much easier to undertake reliable 
analysis of programmes in SMEP and EP there remains a considerable reluctance 
to undertake them and, even if they are undertaken, for them to directly feed 
into current policy. There are of course some notable exceptions, most notably 
several countries in Northern Europe – Denmark, Sweden, UK and Germany. 
Unfortunately, despite its massive spending in this area, we are unable to point to 
a single European Union programme that has been subject to the form of statistical 
analysis used by the studies in Table 1.  
So why is it that the statistical analysis of panels of new and small firms over time 
generates such different results from either the views of programme officials or 
those who seek the views of the recipients of policy?
Four reasons can be proposed: The first is that only panels can reliably iden-
tify the businesses that cease. Over, for example, a five year period at least 50 
percent of SMEs cease trading – with this percentage being even higher for new 
firms. But, since interviews are generally only conducted with surviving firms this 
constitutes a hugely biased sample. Secondly, new and small business owners are 
unrealistically optimistic about both their judgements and the future prospects 
for their enterprise. Questions therefore asking them about whether it was a 
good idea to join a programme and about the future impact on the business 
induce many to provide a positive reaction on the “happy sheet” or to argue 
that any improvement in their firm reflected their skills and not those learnt 
from others. Thirdly the firms that put themselves forward for receiving advice/ 
assistance are more aware, or more knowledgeable, than the more typical firm 
and so are likely to have performed well - even in the absence of the assistance. 
Fourthly some programmes select the firms to participate so, if the selectors are 
effective, then they only select the better firms.11 Any better performance on the 
part of firms in the programme may therefore reflect the skill of the selectors as 
well as the value of the knowledge generated.
Going Forward
If our objective is to provide an environment in which new businesses can be crea-
ted [EP] and in which existing small enterprises can thrive [SMEP], and to do so in 
a cost-effective manner, then the type of analyses described above has to become 
11. This we suspect has the least impact. This is because our suspicions are that the selectors 
are NOT good – or bad – at selecting, but there has yet to be an evaluation funded that 
would enable the merit of the selectors to be assessed!
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commonplace. This requires a change in approach from two groups – the policy 
makers and the entrepreneurship research community. 
Unfortunately, as noted in the paragraphs above, although the science is avai-
lable there appears to be, in many countries, unwillingness on the part of policy-
makers to commit the necessary resources to reliably evaluate EP and SMEP policy 
initiatives. Sometimes this is reflected in an unwillingness to create the datasets 
required, but more frequently it is reflected in an unwillingness to engage in any 
form of policy assessment beyond that of confirming that the monies were distri-
buted in accordance with the law.
The naïve might be tempted to believe that, because evaluation requires resour-
ces, it is an option available only to policy-makers in high income countries. To 
some extent this is the case with some – but not all – the wealthy Nordic countries 
providing examples of well-conducted evaluations. 
However another high income country – the US – appears to have almost no 
record of evaluating SMEP and EP programmes. The Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) report for 2012 reviewed “Support for Entrepreneurs”. It identified 53 
programmes in four different government departments with an aggregate budget 
of 2.6 billion USDs. The views of the GAO on the absence of evaluation were sca-
thing. They say:
“For 39 of the 53 programs, the four agencies have either never conducted 
a performance evaluation or have conducted only one in the past decade. 
For example, while SBA has conducted recent periodic reviews of 3 of its 10 
programs that provide technical assistance, the agency has not reviewed its 
other 9 financial assistance and government contracting programs on any 
regular basis. Without results from program evaluations and performance 
measurement data, agencies lack the ability to measure the overall impact of 
these programs, and decision makers lack information that could help them to 
identify programs that could be better structured and improve the efficiency 
with which the government provides these services”.   
As OECD (2007) noted, there is evidence of a “mindset” amongst SMEP and EP 
policy-makers in some countries that favours evaluation, whereas in others there 
appears to be no appetite whatever for this approach.12 However the emphasis 
placed on programme evaluation by international organisations such as OECD and 
the World Bank [Lopez Acevedo and Tan 2010] are important in slowly changing 
this mindset. There may therefore be some cause for optimism in the future.  
The final change required – and perhaps the most difficult to bring about – is 
amongst scholars of entrepreneurship, entrepreneurs and small business owners. 
12. The curiosity in the US is that it has a long and distinguished history of conducting 
evaluations of labour market programmes [Heckman et al. 1999].
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Obtaining a better understanding of the cost-effective delivery of SMEP and EP 
requires a comprehensive picture of how this highly diverse and disparate group 
changes and evolves over time. In my judgement far too much influential acade-
mic research is conducted on groups of [frequently highly successful] business 
owners leading the naïve to believe that such individuals are the norm. The nasty, 
brutish and short life of most new ventures is less accessible, and considerably 
less glamorous, than the born-global, VC-backed, high-tech, strongly networked 
media-friendly entrepreneur who is only too prepared to share their experience 
with researchers.
Of course researchers have the right to examine any group of entrepreneurs they 
choose. However, as Yang and Aldrich (2012) point out, even when studying those 
businesses that close, the samples of business owners favoured by academics are 
subject to serious size-based bias. Even where they seek comprehensive coverage 
these tend to be drawn from official registration/employment records when many 
new enterprises never reach the threshold required for registration or providing 
employment for others. Once identified, it is then vital that such individuals and 
enterprises are tracked over time. Thirdly the panel has to be of sufficient size to 
conduct statistical analysis. 
The challenge then is for the gatekeepers in the academic community to be 
reluctant to accept work which fails to satisfy these requirements. What this means 
is that the Editors of the top academic journals in the field need to be more open 
to novel ideas when these are based on large scale panel datasets. My personal 
view is that asking a set of college students or modest numbers of business owners 
about their views is not scholarship for publication in the better journals. 
It is therefore as important for academia to put its own house in order as it is 
to lecture the policy community about using appropriate tools for assessing the 
elements enterprise policy that are effective from a taxpayer viewpoint. 
Traditionally one is expected to end by pointing to new areas where research 
is required. In my chosen area this is not the priority. What is required now is to 
do better research using better data and better analytical methods. It is a tough 
message but the squeezing out of poor research is both desirable in its own right 
and serves to send a message to policy-makers about the importance of funding 
rigorous policy evaluations.  
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